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The Almost-Restatement of Income 
Tax of 1954 
WHEN TAX GIANTS ROAMED THE EARTH* 
Lawrence Zelenak† 
INTRODUCTION 
The American Law Institute (ALI) has published 
Restatements of about two dozen areas of the law, ranging 
alphabetically from Agency to Unfair Competition. Even an 
unbiased observer (that is, anyone other than a tax lawyer) 
would probably concede that federal income taxation is at least 
as important a field as a number of the areas of the law that 
have been blessed with Restatements. 
Why, then, has the ALI never produced—or even 
attempted—a Restatement of the Law of Federal Income 
Taxation? One might suppose it is because the goal of restating 
federal income tax law has been too ambitious for even the 
redoubtable ALI, but the truth is closer to the opposite—that a 
mere Restatement was not ambitious enough. According to the 
ALI, Restatements “reflect the law as it presently stands or 
might plausibly be stated by a court. Restatement black-letter 
formulations assume the stance of describing the law as it is.”1 
When the ALI embarked on its Income Tax Project in 1948, it 
was not interested in the relatively modest goal of describing 
existing tax law. Rather, its ambition was “to prepare . . . an 
improved and modernized income tax statute with explanatory 
comments, which will be presented . . . for such consideration as 
Congress may wish to give it.”2 In the ALI’s project classification 
system, this meant that the goal of the Project was the 
 
 *  © 2014 Lawrence Zelenak. All Rights Reserved. 
 † Pamela B. Gann Professor of Law, Duke Law School. 
 1 ALI Overview, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction+projects 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
 2 Herbert F. Goodrich, Annual Report of the Director, 1948 A.L.I. PROC. 1, 16 
(quoting a statement of an anonymous participant in the Income Tax Project). 
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production not of a Restatement, but of a model code. Again 
according to the ALI, “Model codes . . . are addressed mainly to 
legislatures, with a view toward legislative enactment. 
Statutory formulations assume the stance of prescribing the 
law as it shall be.”3 
From the vantage point of 2013, the goal of creating a 
complete model federal income tax statute seems absurdly 
ambitious. Yet by February 1954—just in time for consideration 
by Congress in the drafting of what became the Internal 
Revenue Code of 19544—the ALI had produced a nearly-
complete draft of an income tax statute.5 By design, the Draft 
did not include procedural provisions, provisions applicable to a 
few special classes of taxpayers (“such as insurance companies”), 
or provisions in a few other highly specialized areas (such as 
“pension[s,] trusts[,] and employee benefits”).6 Subject to those 
few exceptions, the 1954 Draft was a complete income tax 
statute.7 Published in two volumes, the 1954 Draft featured 
374 pages of proposed statutory language, accompanied by 587 
pages of explanatory comments. 
Although Congress left large chunks of the ALI’s Draft 
on the cutting room floor, it also followed (to varying degrees) 
the ALI’s lead on many topics—including, perhaps most 
significantly, a complete revision of the partnership tax rules.8 
Both commentators who applauded the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 and those who lamented it agreed that the ALI’s 
fingerprints were all over the Code. Writing in 1955, prominent 
New York tax attorney Norris Darrell, who viewed the 1954 
Code as “a most commendable accomplishment,”9 opined that 
“without the Institute’s groundwork we would not now have the 
new Code.”10 Writing in 1960, Columbia Law School Professor 
William L. Cary, who viewed the 1954 Code as “both erroneously 
conceived and poorly executed,” described the Code as 
 
 3 ALI Overview, supra note 1. 
 4 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (1954). 
 5 See A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTE (Draft, Feb. 1954) [hereinafter 
1954 DRAFT or DRAFT]. 
 6 Id. at xxxi-xxxii. 
 7 See id. 
 8 Compare II ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTE (Draft, Feb. 1954) [hereinafter 
ALI VOLUME II], with Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 701-71, 68A Stat. at 239-54. 
 9 Norris Darrell, Internal Revenue Code of 1954—A Striking Example of the 
Legislative Process in Action, 1955 S. CAL. TAX INST. 1, 25 (1955). 
 10 Id. at 21. 
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“follow[ing] in the Institute’s footsteps—though carelessly and 
inconsistently.”11 
If the ALI were to propose today the drafting of a nearly 
complete model federal income tax statute for the twenty-first 
century, in the hopes that the model would guide Congress in its 
revisions of the Internal Revenue Code, informed observers would 
view the ALI as taking on a doubly hopeless task—hopeless in 
terms of both the drafting challenge and the political challenge. 
Circumstances have changed drastically since 1954. The non-
procedural aspects of the current federal income tax occupy 
nearly 2,350 pages of the current (2012) United States Code—
more than six times the number of pages in the ALI’s draft.12 If a 
2013 model code were to approximate the level of detail of the 
current Internal Revenue Code, the drafting challenge would be 
several times more daunting than the challenge faced by the 
midcentury ALI. And today’s political barriers to the enactment of 
tax reform legislation dwarf those of 1954. As of 2012, virtually all 
Republican members of Congress had taken the no-tax-increase 
pledge of Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform,13 and even 
a revenue-neutral Code revision focused on technical 
improvements would inevitably include many provisions that 
Norquist would describe as tax increases.14 
Even granting these differences in circumstances, it is 
difficult for a tax lawyer in 2013, viewing the handiwork of the 
midcentury ALI’s tax experts, to resist the conclusion that tax 
giants once roamed the earth. Neither those giants nor their 
descendants have been spotted in recent decades. Although the 
ALI has remained active in the federal tax arena, producing a 
number of focused projects on particular aspects of the income tax 
(including the income taxation of corporations, partnerships, 
 
 11 William L. Cary, Reflections Upon the American Law Institute Tax Project 
and the Internal Revenue Code: A Plea for a Moratorium and Reappraisal, 60 COLUM. 
L. REV. 259, 261 (1960). 
 12 The pages of the ALI Draft and those of the current Code are not strictly 
comparable. On the one hand, the Code fits more words on a page than does the ALI 
Draft. On the other hand, the Code contains copious information on effective dates and 
amendments, in addition to the Code itself. The differences work in opposite directions. It 
appears that the differences may approximately offset each other, in which case the page 
counts may, after all, give a good sense of the relative lengths of the two productions. 
 13 Jonathan Weisman, At Fiscal Cliff, Anti-Tax Vow Gets New Look, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 18, 2012, at A1. 
 14 To take an example more-or-less at random, the elimination of the 
charitable deduction for unrealized appreciation in donated property is something the 
ALI might propose as improving the structural coherence of the income tax, but it 
would undeniably result in tax increases for donors. 
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trusts, and estates),15 it has never again attempted the drafting of 
a comprehensive model income tax statute. 
This essay describes the ALI’s Income Tax Project of 
1948–1954—its origins, goals, drafting process, final product, 
and influence on Congress. The essay concludes with some 
thoughts on what role the ALI can and should play today in the 
tax legislative process. Whether the fault is in the stars or in 
ourselves (probably both, but with the stars deserving most of the 
blame), the drafting of a new ALI model income tax statute for 
the twenty-first century would be an almost insurmountable 
challenge in technical terms, and probably pointless in political 
terms. Nevertheless, there remains room for targeted ALI tax 
interventions, with a Restatement-type approach to the 
interpretation of the recently-codified economic substance 
doctrine16 seeming especially promising. 
I. THE MIDCENTURY INCOME TAX PROJECT: GENESIS, 
GOALS, AND PROCESS 
The ALI’s Income Tax Project began in 1948.17 
According to ALI Director Herbert Goodrich, in 1946 Colin 
Stam, the long-time Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation,18 informally suggested to Norris Darrell that an ALI-
produced model income tax statute could be helpful to the Joint 
Committee and to Congress.19 Leading members of the Senate 
Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee 
added their unofficial encouragement, as did high-level Treasury 
officials.20 ALI President Harrison Tweed told a slightly different 
version of the story. According to Tweed, the Project grew out of 
some discussions which one of the members of our Council had . . . with 
representatives of the Treasury, the Joint Committee, and the  
 15 The ALI’s post-1954 income tax projects are described infra notes 111-120 
and accompanying text. 
 16 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (2011). The statute defines the doctrine as “the 
common law doctrine under which tax benefits under subtitle A with respect to a 
transaction are not allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or 
lacks a business purpose.” Id. 
 17 Darrell, supra note 9, at 17-18. 
 18 “The Joint Committee on Taxation is a nonpartisan [congressional 
committee] . . . chaired on a rotating basis by the Chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee and the Chairman of House Ways and Means Committee.” Overview, JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/overview.html (last visited Oct. 
30, 2013) (providing a fuller description of the Committee). 
 19 General Revenue Provision: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 83d Cong. 1812-13 (1953) [hereinafter General Revenue Provision Hearings] 
(statement of Herbert F. Goodrich, judge, U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the 3d Cir.). 
 20 Id. at 1813; see also Darrell, supra note 9, at 17. 
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committees of the two Houses of Congress. They expressed the hope and 
the expectation that something might be done by the Institute to help in 
the situation which then existed and has existed for a long while, that 
the Income Tax Law needed overhauling and some fairly major 
changes and alterations in the judgment of a disinterested body.21 
The ALI sought funding for the project from the Maurice 
and Laura Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh, and received an initial 
grant of $225,000, later supplemented by additional grants, 
bringing the total to $620,00022 (over $6 million in 2013 dollars).23 
Harvard Law School Professor Stanley S. Surrey was appointed 
Chief Reporter for the Project, and Columbia Law School 
Professor (later Dean) William C. Warren was appointed 
Associate Chief Reporter.24 A small but elite army aided the 
reporters’ efforts. The reporters were advised by a 10-member Tax 
Policy Committee consisting of eight leading tax attorneys, along 
with the President and the Director of the ALI.25 The reporters 
were assisted by nine special consultants whose duties focused 
on various aspects of the Project.26 The reporters also regularly 
sought the input of a Tax Advisory Group composed of the 
members of the Policy Committee, the special consultants, and 
more than 50 tax law luminaries from around the country.27 
For several years the Policy Committee convened “about 
once a month for [a] one [or] two-day meeting[ ] ” to determine 
the policies to be embodied in the model statute and to review 
proposed provisions drafted by the Reporters with the aid of 
their research assistants.28 Following approval by the Policy 
Committee, proposed provisions were presented as discussion 
drafts to the Tax Advisory Committee at the annual meeting of 
the ALI.29 After further revision in response to the comments of 
 
 21 A.L.I., Remarks of Harrison Tweed, 2 26TH ANN. MEETING OF THE ALI IN 
JOINT SESSION WITH THE NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 618, 618-19 
(1949) [hereinafter Remarks of Harrison Tweed]. 
 22 HERBERT F. GOODRICH & PAUL A. WOLKIN, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE, 1923-1961 29 (1961). 
 23 CPI Inflation Calculator, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/ 
data/inflation_calculator.htm (input “620,000” in “$” field, select “1948” in “in” 
dropdown menu, then click “calculate”). 
 24 GOODRICH & WOLKIN, supra note 22, at 30. 
 25 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at v. Norris Darrell, Erwin Griswold, and 
Randolph Paul were among the members of the Policy Committee. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at vi. There was nary a woman among the seventy-two members of the 
Tax Advisory Group, although there were two women among the two-dozen research 
assistants to the reporters. Id. at vii. 
 28 Stanley S. Surrey & William C. Warren, The Income Tax Project of the 
American Law Institute: Gross Income, Deductions, Accounting, Gains and Losses, 
Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66 HARV. L. REV. 761, 766 (1953). 
 29 Id. at 767. 
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the Advisory Committee, the discussion drafts were presented 
to the 40-member governing Council of the ALI.30 The reporters 
then prepared tentative drafts for presentation to the full 
membership of the ALI at its annual meetings.31 All told, the 
reporters produced 11 tentative drafts.32 In February 1954, with 
Congress at work on what was to become the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954, the ALI published a compilation of the drafts and 
accompanying commentary as its “Federal Income Tax Statute, 
February 1954 Draft.”33 
In the foreword to the Draft, ALI Director Goodrich 
explained that, unlike Restatements, the model statute and 
commentary had never been officially promulgated by the ALI.34 
He described the statute and commentary as “represent[ing] a 
composite of the views of [the] Tax Policy Committee and the 
Reporters assisted by the Special Consultants and guided 
by . . . the Tax Advisory Group, the Council of the Institute[,] and 
the Institute membership and by informal discussion with other 
organizations in the tax field.”35 Noting the ongoing tax revision 
efforts in Congress, Goodrich observed, “If there ever was a time 
when an objective study would be helpful to a legislative 
group, . . . this seems to be the time.”36 Four years earlier, near 
the inception of the Project, ALI President Tweed—who was 
obviously unable to imagine what the Internal Revenue Code 
would look like in 2013—had set a low bar for judging the 
Project’s real-world success: “Anything that is accomplished 
will be worthwhile, because the current situation . . . cannot be 
much worse.”37 
In describing the goals of the Income Tax Project, the 
ALI explained that it intended to steer clear of political big-
picture tax policy issues. Questions such as the design of the 
tax rate schedules, whether and how to tax capital gains, and 
the double taxation (or not) of corporate income, were all—
emphasized Tweed—“fiscal and political questions into which it 
would serve no useful purpose for the Institute to plunge.”38 The 
 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 GOODRICH & WOLKIN, supra note 22, at 29. 
 33 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5. 
 34 Id. at iv. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Remarks of Harrison Tweed, supra note 21, at 628. 
 38 Id. at 624; see also Surrey & Warren, supra note 28, at 764 (making the 
same point and giving additional examples of political questions beyond the scope of 
the Project, including the tax treatment of municipal bond interest and the percentage 
depletion allowance). 
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Project’s ambitions were, nevertheless, considerable. Tweed 
insisted that the goal was not “a mere statement of the law as it 
now stands,”39 and Surrey and Warren concurred: “It is not a 
mere tinkering here and there, a tidying up of one provision or 
a smoothing out of another.”40 Rather, explained Surrey and 
Warren, the focus of the Project was on the “broad middle 
ground . . . which we have come to refer to as the ‘technical’ 
provisions of the income tax.”41 They elaborated: “The term 
‘technical’ is used to contrast the provisions which are largely 
shaped by tax technicians . . . with the provisions whose 
content is determined by . . . political compromises.”42 Within 
that broad middle ground, Goodrich explained, the goal was not 
the ALI’s usual goal of restatement: “Here in this field of 
legislative drafting we are frankly going to state the law as we 
think it should be.”43 
In an impressive display of self-confidence—if not 
hubris—Surrey and Warren described the Project as “a major 
frontal attack on the technical shortcomings of our federal 
income tax.”44 Because technical shortcomings permeated the 
entire Code, “All of the major segments of the income tax—gross 
income, deductions, gains and losses, accounting provisions, 
partnerships, trusts, corporations, income from sources abroad—
are within [the Project’s] scope.”45 Viewing such technical issues 
as essentially apolitical, Tweed claimed that the ALI’s proposal 
would be drafted “by men who know their business but who have 
no political axes to grind and have no self-interest to serve.”46 
Surrey and Warren acknowledged that the distinction between 
big-picture policy questions and technical issues could be 
indistinct at the margin, but they confidently asserted that “an 
awareness of the difference between the two and a desire to stay 
within the confines of technical policy afford proper guidance.”47 
 
 39 Remarks of Harrison Tweed, supra note 21, at 624. 
 40 Surrey & Warren, supra note 28, at 765. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Goodrich, supra note 2, at 18. 
 44 Surrey & Warren, supra note 28, at 765. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Remarks of Harrison Tweed, supra note 21, at 629. 
 47 Surrey & Warren, supra note 28, at 765. At least as of 1948, Judge 
Learned Hand was less sanguine about the possibility of separating the technical from 
the political. According to Goodrich, Hand remarked that “the subject will develop such 
a degree of heat among the members of the Institute that the Director should take the 
precaution to have a platoon of police officers on hand to assist the Chairman in 
preserving order.” Goodrich, supra note 2, at 23. 
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In addition to the major goal of substantive technical 
improvement, the Project had a secondary goal of proposing a 
more user-friendly Internal Revenue Code. The drafters aimed 
to incorporate important judicial glosses into the statute itself, 
and to improve the clarity and readability of the statute.48  
Writing in 1953, when most of the work of the Project 
had been accomplished but Congress had not yet legislated, 
Surrey and Warren pronounced the Project an unqualified 
success on the merits: “In no other tax forum has there been so 
fair, so objective, or so intelligent a consideration of technical 
tax issues . . . . [F]or the first time in the history of the federal 
income tax we are becoming really aware of its anatomical 
structure, so to speak.”49 
Although the influence of the Project on the 1954 Code 
can be gauged by comparing the ALI’s February 1954 Draft 
with the 1954 legislation (as discussed in the following section 
of this essay), there is little direct evidence of the extent to 
which the tax-writing committees of Congress and their staffs 
consulted with Surrey and Warren or worked from the ALI’s 
various tentative drafts. As Goodrich pointed out in his foreword 
to the February 1954 Draft, the ALI “does not lobby for this 
Code or any other piece of legislation.”50 But as Tax Policy 
Committee member Robert Miller remarked, “There is no 
question, however, that the men who are engaged in these [ALI] 
efforts are favorably known to the congressional committees 
and their staffs, and that serious consideration will be given to 
the Institute’s recommendations.”51 
ALI President Tweed reported in 1949 that Surrey and 
Warren had “been in close contact with representatives of the 
Joint Committee, and representatives of the Joint Committee 
ha[d] attended meetings of the Policy Committee’s hostings.”52 
According to Darrell, the Policy Committee, along with Surrey 
and Warren and their staff, had two meetings—one in 1953 
and one in 1954—with the Joint Committee and Treasury 
staffs for wide-ranging discussions of the ALI’s drafts and the 
pending legislation.53 Darrell also reported that in 1954 several 
of the people most closely connected with the Project “were 
 
 48 Goodrich, supra note 2, at 12-13; see also 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at xvii. 
 49 Surrey & Warren, supra note 28, at 768. 
 50 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at iv. 
 51 Robert N. Miller, The Law Institute’s Income Tax Project: An Answer to a 
Challenge, 37 A.B.A. J. 191, 194 (1951). 
 52 Remarks of Harrison Tweed, supra note 21, at 621. 
 53 Darrell, supra note 9, at 19. 
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repeatedly called upon for counsel and advice in connection 
with the revision of [the House bill].”54 
The most prominent acknowledgment of the legislative 
influence of the ALI’s Income Tax Project occurred in August 
1953, when ALI Director Goodrich appeared at a tax revision 
hearing of the Ways and Means Committee. Emphasizing that 
he was not “advocating this or any other publication,” Goodrich 
offered the Committee the material the Project had produced to 
that point.55 In thanking Goodrich, Committee Chairman Daniel 
Reed commented, “You have undertaken what I consider a 
monumental and very important piece of work for the whole 
country, and you are making a very helpful contribution.”56 
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ALI’S FEBRUARY 1954 
DRAFT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE 1954 CODE 
Judged on its merits, the February 1954 Draft largely 
fulfilled the ALI’s goals for the Income Tax Project. The model 
statute was clearly—at times even elegantly—drafted. Even 
William L. Cary, perhaps the harshest critic of the ALI’s decision 
to draft a highly detailed statute (by midcentury standards), who 
viewed the ALI’s alleged goal of “SPECIFICITY AT ALL COST” 
to have been “erroneously conceived,”57 conceded that the ALI’s 
Draft was “well executed” by “superior craftsmen.”58 
The successful effort to incorporate established judicial 
interpretations of the statute into the statute itself—so as to 
make finding the law much easier for non-specialist readers—is 
evident throughout the Draft, from the addition of a 
nonexclusive list of 20 items includible in gross income,59 to a 
codification of the exclusion from gross income of working 
condition fringes,60 to a comprehensive compilation of the 
 
 54 Id. at 20. 
 55 General Revenue Provision Hearings, supra note 19, at 1814 (statement of 
Herbert F. Goodrich). 
 56 Id. (remarks of Rep. Daniel Reed, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways and Means). 
 57 Cary, supra note 11, at 259, 261 (capitalization in original). 
 58 Id. at 260, 261. 
 59 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 25-27. This approach was followed by 
Congress. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 61, 68A Stat. 3, 17 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2011)). 
 60 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 30. This approach was followed by Congress 
three decades later. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531(a), 98 Stat. 
494, 877 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 132(f) (2011)). Working condition fringes are in-kind 
benefits received by an employee from an employer, the cost of which would be 
deductible by the employee as a business expense if the employee had paid for the 
benefits herself.  
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various ways of obtaining a “cost” basis in an asset,61 to a 
proposed codification of the doctrine of constructive receipt.62 
Surprisingly, however, in a few instances the Draft moved in 
the opposite direction, by eliminating existing statutory detail 
with the explanation that the detail would be better relegated 
to the regulations (but without offering a guiding principle as 
to when a detail belonged in the statute and when it belonged 
in the regulations).63 
As the ALI drafters had promised, they did not limit 
themselves to a user-friendly restatement of existing tax law. 
They offered ambitious rewrites of substantial portions of the 
Internal Revenue Code, sometimes merely to incorporate judicial 
glosses into the statute, but often to resolve unsettled issues or 
to make significant substantive changes to settled law. For 
example, the Draft proposed a much more elaborate statutory 
treatment of cancellation-of-indebtedness income, which in some 
respects merely added to the statute well-established judicial 
(and administrative) interpretations, but in other cases 
resolved unsettled issues.64 
Significant changes in the Code proposed by the Draft are 
far too numerous to describe them all here, but a few 
representative examples provide a sense of the Draft’s ambitions. 
Among many other changes, the Draft proposed: 
– Nonrecognition of gain and loss, and a transferred 
basis regime, for property transferred in connection 
with a divorce;65 Congress did not adopt this 
 
 61 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 118-20. Congress has never enacted a 
similar provision. 
 62 Id. at 138-39. Again, Congress has never enacted a similar provision. 
Under the doctrine of constructive receipt, “A taxpayer may not deliberately turn his 
back upon income and thus select the year for which he will report it.” Hamilton Nat’l 
Bank of Chattanooga v. Comm’r, 29 B.T.A. 63, 67 (1933). 
 63 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 107, 357 (moving from the statute to the 
regulations much of the detail concerning the nonrecognition of gain on the sale of a 
personal residence); id. at 148-49, 424 (moving details of the discount bond rules from 
the statute to the regulations). 
 64 See id. at 34-43. One innovation of the ALI’s treatment of cancellation-of-
indebtedness income was its choice of mistake-correction over balance-sheet as the 
exclusive theory of debt-cancellation income. Id. at 35. Despite the ALI’s efforts, this issue 
remains unresolved even today. Lawrence Zelenak, Cancellation-of-Indebtedness Income 
and Transactional Accounting, 29 VA. TAX REV. 277, 280-85 (2009) (describing the unsettled 
state of the law). Another ALI innovation was the explicit statutory adoption of a bifurcation 
approach to the disposition of property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage in excess of the 
value of the property. 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 38. Decades later, the Supreme Court 
settled on a different approach. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1983). 
 65 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 28, 114. 
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approach in 1954, but finally did so three decades 
later.66 
– A major revision of the rules for calculating the 
portion of an annuity payment excludable from gross 
income;67 Congress adopted the ALI approach in the 
1954 Code.68 
– Elective relief provisions for taxpayers subject to 
either the tax benefit rule69 or the claim of right 
doctrine70 and adversely affected by differences in 
marginal tax rates in different years;71 oddly, the 1954 
Code followed the ALI approach in the case of the 
claim of right doctrine, but not in the case of the tax 
benefit rule.72 
– Elimination of the rule generally permitting capital 
losses to be deducted only against capital gains;73 
Congress has never been persuaded to follow the ALI’s 
lead on this issue. 
– Extension of the nonrecognition treatment for 
exchanges of like-kind property to sales of like-kind 
property followed by purchases of like-kind replacement 
property;74 neither the 1954 legislation nor later 
legislation adopted this proposal. 
– Introducing the concept of “tainted” stock as a means of 
preventing the use of dividends of preferred stock as a 
device for distributing corporate earnings at capital 
 
 66 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421, 98 Stat. 494, 793-95. 
 67 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 47. 
 68 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 72(b), 68A Stat. 3, 20 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 72(b) (2011)). 
 69 Under the tax benefit rule, if an event occurs in a later year which is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the taxpayer’s claiming of a deduction in an earlier 
year, the taxpayer must offset the earlier deduction with a gross income inclusion in 
the later year. Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 383-85 (1983). 
 70 Under the claim of right doctrine, if a taxpayer receives an amount in an 
earlier year under a “claim of right” and includes that amount in gross income, but the 
taxpayer is required to repay that amount because of developments in a later year, the 
taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for the repayment in the later year. United States v. 
Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1951). 
 71 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 157-60. 
 72 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 1341, 68A Stat. at 348 (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 1341 (2011)). 
 73 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 101-02. 
 74 Id. at 106. 
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gains rates;75 the 1954 Code took the same basic 
approach as the ALI’s Draft.76 
– Introduction of ownership attribution rules of 
mechanical application, for use in determining 
whether stock redemptions are to be taxed as 
dividends or as sales;77 the 1954 Code followed the 
ALI’s approach, with modifications.78 
– Extension of the so-called General Utilities rule 
(under which a corporation did not recognize gain on 
the in-kind distribution to its shareholders of 
appreciated assets)79 to sales of assets by a closely-held 
corporation in connection with a plan of complete 
liquidation;80 the 1954 Code went even further, 
applying the ALI approach to all liquidating 
corporations, whether closely-held or public.81 
– A major change in the continuity-of-interest rules for 
tax-free acquisitive reorganizations, under which 
satisfaction of the continuity requirement depended 
on the percentage of the stock of the acquiring 
corporation owned by the shareholders of the target 
corporation following the acquisition;82 Congress has 
never enacted the ALI approach.83 
– The elimination of rules against “thin incorporation”; 
under the ALI approach corporate debt owned 
proportionately to stock would never be reclassified 
merely because of the combination of the proportional 
 
 75 ALI VOLUME II, supra note 8, at 16-20. 
 76 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 306, 68A Stat. at 90-93 (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 306). 
 77 ALI VOLUME II, supra note 8, at 31-33. 
 78 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 318, 68A Stat. at 99-101 (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 318). 
 79 The doctrine’s name is derived from the Supreme Court case 
acknowledging the existence of the doctrine. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Comm’r, 
296 U.S. 200, 206 (1935). 
 80 ALI VOLUME II, supra note 8, at 37-39. 
 81 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 337, 68A Stat. at 106-07 (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 337). 
 82 ALI VOLUME II, supra note 8, at 54-57. 
 83 Norris Darrell, despite his overall enthusiasm for the ALI’s February 1954 
Draft, commented, “This particular provision in the Institute’s draft may not have been 
a wise one; insufficient consideration may have been given to the theoretical or 
practical factors involved, or both.” Darrell, supra note 9, at 22. 
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ownership and a high ratio of insider debt to equity;84 
Congress also has never enacted this approach. 
The February 1954 Draft also proposed comprehensive 
revisions of the provisions governing the income taxation of 
trusts and of partnerships,85 and the influence of the draft on 
the 1954 legislation in these areas was immense. 
As the legislative fates of the ALI provisions mentioned 
above suggest, the ALI was moderately successful in leaving its 
imprint on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Despite their 
deep disagreement on the merits of the Income Tax Project, 
William L. Cary and Norris Darrell agreed that the Draft 
played a major role in shaping the new Code.86 The ALI Draft 
influenced both the style and the substance of the 1954 Code. 
In a number of areas, the Code followed the ALI’s drafting 
preference for a more fully elaborated set of rules than had 
been featured in the 1939 version of the Code. Cary noted with 
disapproval, “In both instances [the 1954 Draft and the 1954 
Code] the policy of the draftsmen seems to have been that tax 
statutes should be as specific, detailed, and inclusive as 
possible.”87 As for the ALI’s substantive influence on the 1954 
Code, the results were mixed.  
The ALI cared enough about the extent of its influence to 
publish, early in 1955, a 30-page “Comparison of the American 
Law Institute February, 1954 Income Tax Draft and 1954 
Internal Revenue Code.”88 There were major successes. As the 
ALI’s Comparison observed, the partnership tax provisions of the 
1954 Code were “almost entirely in accord with” the sweeping 
revisions of the ALI Draft.89 The ALI enjoyed another major 
victory with respect to its proposed revisions of the income 
taxation of trusts, as to which the 1954 Code was, again, “almost 
entirely in accord with” the ALI Draft’s “complete revision.”90 The 
1954 Code also followed the ALI’s lead on a number of narrower 
issues, including the formula for determining the nontaxable 
portion of an annuity payment, an attack on so-called preferred 
stock bailouts, the introduction of detailed ownership attribution 
 
 84 ALI VOLUME II, supra note 8, at 2-3, 231-32. 
 85 Id. at 121-46 (trusts) and 86-119 (partnerships). 
 86 See supra text accompanying notes 9-11. 
 87 Cary, supra note 11, at 259. 
 88 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT: COMPARISON OF 
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE FEBRUARY, 1954 INCOME TAX DRAFT AND 1954 INTERNAL 
REVENUE CODE (1955) [hereinafter ALI COMPARISON]. 
 89 Id. at 29. 
 90 Id. at 28. 
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rules applicable to stock redemptions, and the extension of the 
General Utilities doctrine to asset sales in connection with a plan of 
complete liquidation.91 
On the other hand, the new Code did not reflect the 
Draft’s complete overhaul of the cancellation-of-indebtedness 
provisions, because (according to the ALI) Congress had 
decided that “more study [was] required.”92 Also left on the 
cutting room floor by Congress were (among many other items) 
the Draft’s elimination of the limitations on the deductibility of 
capital losses, the extension of like-kind exchange gain 
nonrecognition to sales followed by reinvestments, and the 
elimination of the recharacterization of proportional debt as 
equity because of a high debt to equity ratio.93 
In a few areas, the Draft’s approach had no impact on 
the 1954 Code, but was adopted by Congress decades later. 
Examples include the enactment of an express gross income 
inclusion for working condition fringe benefits in 1984, and the 
adoption—also in 1984—of nonrecognition and transferred basis 
rules for property transferred in connection with a divorce.94 
There may have been some veiled disappointment in 
ALI Director Goodrich’s 1955 Annual Report that Congress was 
not more strongly influenced by the Draft: 
We feel highly pleased with the contribution which our work made to 
the revision of the income tax law. No one ever expected the 
Congress to take it over bodily. Congress has its own responsibility 
on such things and also its own ideas. The most we hoped to do was 
to make a contribution on the technical side. That we did and that 
we shall continue to do.95 
One suspects that Goodrich did not think it altogether a 
good thing that Congress had “its own ideas.” Darrell’s evaluation 
of the success of the Income Tax Project was similar to Goodrich’s: 
[N]o one, not even the Institute, could or did within reason expect 
this private work to be officially taken over intact. The most that 
could be or was hoped for was that a useful contribution could be 
made—that at least parts of the work would find favor. That, it 
would appear, has happened . . . . I believe that the time spent by the 
 
 91 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68 (annuities), 75-76 (bailouts), 77-
78 (attribution rules), and 80-81 (General Utilities). 
 92 ALI COMPARISON, supra note 88, at 2. 
 93 See supra text accompanying notes 73 (capital losses), 74 (like-kind 
nonrecognition), and 84 (debt-equity ratio). 
 94 See supra text accompanying notes 60 (working condition fringes), and 65-
66 (divorce-related property transfers). 
 95 Herbert F. Goodrich, Report of the Director, 1955 A.L.I. ANN. REP. 5, 12. 
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Institute was well spent and that, viewed in retrospect, the project 
from the Institute’s standpoint can be considered successful.96 
Despite the hints of disappointment in the post-mortems 
of Goodrich and Darrell, the February 1954 Draft stands as a 
major accomplishment—not only on its merits, but also for the 
extent of its legislative influence. Given the immense difficulties 
of persuading Congress to enact tax reform legislation, for the 
Income Tax Project to have emerged from the 1954 legislative 
process with half a loaf of influence was no trifling achievement. 
That a group of private individuals could—without lobbying and 
solely on the merits of their proposals—have a significant impact 
on a major revision of the federal income tax is remarkable. 
III. EVALUATING THE PROJECT: THE ALI DRAFT, AVOIDING 
THE IMPORTANT ISSUES, AND THE DREAM OF A SIMPLE 
CODE 
In the early 1960s two prominent tax professionals offered 
two criticisms of the ALI’s 1954 Draft. Although the two criticisms 
were completely different in substance, they were alike in raising 
fundamental questions about the value of the ALI’s efforts. 
Writing in 1961, prominent tax practitioner Louis 
Eisenstein complained that the ALI’s Project was insufficiently 
ambitious.97 Although the ALI claimed to avoid broad policy 
questions and to concern itself only with technical matters, 
Eisenstein argued that the ALI’s actual practice was to avoid 
controversial issues while attending only to questions that 
were noncontroversial (and therefore not very important): 
Actually, the Institute handles many questions that are well within 
the realm of “broad” policy. It only avoids those which fail to evoke 
an “objective” spirit of togetherness . . . . On critical issues, then, the 
Institute is “nonpartisan” only in the sense that it is discreetly 
silent. If the Institute tried to speak, too many excited voices would 
be heard. It is not difficult to be nonpartisan if one studiously avoids 
partisan issues.98 
There would have been little point, however, in the 
ALI’s tackling any of the great tax policy controversies. The 
great policy issues—the extent of progression in the rate 
structure, for example—are intensely political. As an 
organization with members from across the political spectrum, 
 
 96 Darrell, supra note 9, at 25. 
 97 LOUIS EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 168-69 (2010). 
 98 Id. at 168. 
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the ALI could not have reached a consensus on any of those 
issues. And even if by some miracle it had managed to do so, 
Congress would have had no interest in deferring to the ALI’s 
judgment on (for example) the optimal tax rate schedule. 
Eisenstein was correct in his implication that the ALI was 
doing little more, metaphorically speaking, than rearranging 
the deck chairs on the ocean liner that was the Internal 
Revenue Code. In that sense, it was a modest project. But there 
is value to putting the deck chairs in order—as long as the ship 
is not sinking, and in 1954 few thought that it was. 
The other criticism was William Cary’s 1960 attack on 
the ALI’s preferred style of statutory draftsmanship, which was 
considerably more detailed than that of the 1939 Code.99 
Although this critique found its fullest expression in Cary’s 
post-Draft commentary, the ALI’s preference for elaboration was 
controversial from the outset. At the 1949 ALI annual meeting, 
ALI President Tweed recounted that one of the original members 
of the Tax Policy Committee, Roscoe McGill, was so disappointed 
that the Committee had rejected the goal of a “short, concise 
tax statute” that he resigned from the Committee.100 
From the perspective of 2013, it is difficult to evaluate 
the criticism of the February 1954 Draft as inordinately 
complex, because the Draft is immensely simpler than today’s 
Internal Revenue Code. Cary does not claim that the Draft was 
the apotheosis of complexity; indeed he notes that the Draft’s 
“emphasis on specificity is as nothing by comparison with the 
1954 Code.”101 And although Cary could not have known it in 
1960, the complexity of the 1954 Code is itself as nothing by 
comparison with that of today’s Code.102 
It is fair to say, however, that most of the post-1954 
increase in statutory complexity is due to substantive policy 
choices of Congress, rather than to an ever-increasing preference 
for statutory specification of detail. Some of those post-1954 policy 
choices are widely applauded by tax technicians and policy 
analysts.103 From today’s perspective, the 1954 Code was 
 
 99 Cary, supra note 11. 
 100 Remarks of Harrison Tweed, supra note 21, at 627. 
 101 Cary, supra note 11, at 265. 
 102 Cary did, however, fear that the worst was yet to come, writing, 
“Undoubtedly some committee will still be worrying about these problems [of thin 
incorporation and collapsible corporations] decades hence—when each of them may 
well occupy at least twenty pages of the code.” Id. at 268. 
 103 For example, despite the complexity of section 1272 (requiring current 
inclusion in gross income of original issue discount), few if any policy analysts would 
favor a return to the economically inaccurate approach of prior law. 
2014] ALMOST-RESTATEMENT OF INCOME TAX 725 
shockingly defenseless against tax shelters.104 The additional 
complexity attributable to various post-1954 anti-shelter 
provisions is a price worth paying to safeguard the integrity of 
the income tax.105 
Much of the post-1954 increase in the length of the 
Code, however, is attributable to the proliferation in recent 
decades of tax expenditures of dubious merit. And much of the 
increase in tax return computational complexity is due to the 
alternative minimum tax (AMT) and various phaseout 
provisions—with both the AMT and the majority of the phaseouts 
being difficult or impossible to defend on the merits.106 
Setting aside these post-1954 increases in the length of 
the Code attributable to substantive policy choices of Congress 
(some good, some bad), and focusing on Cary’s question of the 
appropriate level of statutory detail to implement any given 
legislative policy, what are the merits of his critique of the ALI’s 
drafting philosophy? As between Cary and the ALI, the ALI has 
by far the better of the argument. Consider what Cary offers as 
“[o]ne of the best illustrations of the ALI philosophy”107—its 
inclusion in the “keystone section” defining gross income of not 
only a general definition of gross income, but also a non-exclusive 
list of 20 items included in gross income. According to Cary, “no 
satisfactory function was served by meticulously cataloguing the 
various kinds of receipts that the courts have thus far held to 
be income.”108 
Cary’s verdict has a whiff of unconscious elitism. 
Perhaps a list of 20 items included in gross income would have 
served no purpose for Cary, because he was already aware of 
all the judicial decisions distilled in the list. For a less expert 
reader of the Code, however, it would be immensely easier to 
determine the tax status of a particular type of receipt by 
finding it in a list of gross income inclusions, than by tracking 
down the authoritative judicial interpretation. Cary’s focus is 
 
 104 Tax shelters were then in their infancy. The first modern tax shelter case 
to reach the Supreme Court, Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 362 (1960) 
(involving a shelter based on a tax-motivated combination of tax-preferred income and 
interest expense deductions), concerned tax years 1953 and 1954. 
 105 Although there are a number of more-or-less complex post-1954 anti-
shelter provisions, probably the most significant are the passive loss rules of § 469, 
enacted in 1986. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501, 100 Stat. 2085, 
2233 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 469 (2011)). 
 106 For a detailed discussion of the objections to the AMT and the various 
phaseouts, see Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 
COLUM. J. TAX L. 91, 98-115 (2010). 
 107 Cary, supra note 11, at 265. 
 108 Id. at 266. 
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on the Code’s word count, rather than on the lived complexity 
of the tax laws. Even if the Code is considered in isolation—
apart from its judicial and regulatory interpretations—Cary’s 
view is mistaken. A list is not complex; exceptions to exceptions 
to exceptions generate complexity, but a mere list does not. 
Cary makes a second, more important error—conflating 
the Code with the tax laws (which include judicial and 
administrative pronouncements, as well as the statute itself). 
Omitting the list from the gross income provision would make 
the Code shorter, but would actually make the tax laws more 
complex for the average reader. By incorporating into the statute 
important judicial glosses and administrative interpretations, the 
ALI’s drafting strategy makes the tax laws simpler—more 
transparent, more accessible, more comprehensible—for the 
typical user. Cary never offers a satisfactory defense of his 
fetishization of a low statutory word count, even at the price of 
greater complexity of the tax laws in their entirety. 
Cary does suggest an expertise-based reason for 
preferring a short and simple tax statute: “Congress . . . is 
performing the role formerly left to the Internal Revenue Service, 
the Treasury, and the courts, and at the same time has no 
thorough understanding of what it is enacting.”109 This aspect of 
Cary’s critique does not depend on a fetishized concern with 
complexity in the statute, without regard to the overall complexity 
of the laws. One could conclude (correctly) that putting most of 
the details in the regulations rather than in the statute does 
not make the laws any simpler, and yet prefer putting the 
details in the regulations because the Treasury Department is 
likely to draft higher quality details than would Congress. 
Nevertheless, this aspect of Cary’s critique is also unconvincing 
for two reasons. First, the question of the relative detail-
drafting skills of the staffs of the Treasury and of the tax-
writing committees in Congress is a highly contingent one, 
with different answers at different times (and perhaps even at 
any given time, for different issues). Second, this aspect of 
Cary’s critique fails utterly as a criticism of the ALI Draft, 
because—as Cary himself conceded—the authors of the ALI 
Draft were “superior craftsmen.”110 There is no reason to 
suppose that the midcentury Treasury Department could have 
produced detailed regulations superior to the ALI’s detailed 
statutory provisions. 
 
 109 Id. at 260. 
 110 Id. 
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IV. POST-1954 ALI TAX PROJECTS, ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL 
The ALI remained active in federal taxation after 1954. 
Its first major post-1954 tax production was a 1958 “Report of 
Working Views” (never submitted to the ALI membership for 
approval) on the “Income Tax Problems of Corporations and 
Shareholders.”111 Writing in 1961, Director Goodrich and 
Associate Director Wolkin predicted that the ALI’s involvement in 
tax policy would continue “[a]s long as there is worthwhile work 
to do in the tax field.”112 
The ensuing decades have borne out their prediction. 
Highlights have included estate and gift tax recommendations 
adopted by the ALI in 1968,113 proposals for the reform of the 
tax treatment of corporate acquisitions and dispositions 
(1980),114 proposals for the reform of the partnership tax 
provisions of the Code (1982),115 proposals for the revision of the 
income taxation of trusts and estates (1984),116 proposals for 
reform of the taxation of foreign persons and of foreign-source 
income (1986),117 proposals regarding United States income tax 
treaties (1991),118 a 1993 Reporter’s Study of corporate tax 
integration,119 and a 1999 Reporter’s Study of the taxation of 
closely-held business enterprises.120 
These proposals enjoyed a few legislative successes. For 
example, a 1958 proposal for a detailed statutory definition of 
corporate debt (as contrasted with equity)121 foreshadowed the 
 
 111 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT: INCOME TAX 
PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (1958) [hereinafter ALI TAX 
PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS]. 
 112 GOODRICH & WOLKIN, supra note 22, at 31. 
 113 A.L.I., WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, & A. JAMES CASNER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND 
GIFT TAXATION: RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTERS’ STUDIES (1969). 
 114 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS (1982) [hereinafter ALI SUBCHAPTER C]. 
 115 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER K: PROPOSALS ON THE 
TAXATION OF PARTNERS (1984). 
 116 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER J: PROPOSALS ON THE 
TAXATION OF TRUST AND ESTATE INCOME AND INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENTS (1985). 
 117 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED 
STATES INCOME TAXATION: PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN 
PERSONS AND OF THE FOREIGN INCOME OF UNITED STATES PERSONS (1987). 
 118 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED 
STATES INCOME TAXATION II: PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES (1992). 
 119 A.L.I. & ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: 
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES AND REPORTER’S 
STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION (1993). 
 120 A.L.I., GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: 
TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES AND REPORTERS’ STUDY (1999). 
 121 ALI TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 111, 
at 62-63. 
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1969 enactment of section 385 of the Code, which authorized the 
Treasury to promulgate detailed regulations distinguishing debt 
from equity.122 Perhaps the most significant post-1954 ALI 
success in the tax legislative arena was the 1986 rejection of the 
General Utilities doctrine,123 under which corporations had not 
recognized gain on the in-kind distribution of appreciated assets 
to their shareholders. The ALI’s 1980 Proposals on Corporate 
Acquisitions and Dispositions had advocated the doctrine’s 
demise,124 and Congress complied six years later.  
On the whole, however, the ALI’s post-1954 tax efforts 
have found less favor with Congress than the 1954 Draft did. 
In part this may have been because the post-1954 proposals 
were often more legislatively ambitious than the 1954 Draft in 
calling for fundamental overhauls of some long-settled areas of 
the law—for example, the 1993 proposal for the integration of 
the corporate and individual income taxes, and the 1999 
proposal of a new tax regime for private business enterprises. 
Beyond the lesser influence on Congress of the later ALI 
proposals, the striking difference between the post-1954 ALI 
efforts and the 1954 Draft is the much narrower focus of the 
later projects. The 1954 Draft encompassed almost the entirety 
of the federal income tax; even viewed in the aggregate, the 
more recent efforts have grappled with only a few subchapters. 
Only once in the decades since 1954 has anyone even proposed 
an ALI tax project of comparable scope to the 1954 Draft. 
Writing in 1997, Harvard Law Professor Daniel Halperin 
argued that the income tax could be saved only if “we” could 
develop “a more accurate measure of income, one that would be 
simpler, more efficient, and most importantly, fair.”125 For the 
project he envisioned, comparable in scope to the 1954 Draft, 
Halperin proposed the ALI’s process: 
 
 122 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415, 83 Stat. 487, 613-14 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 385 (2011)). Although the enactment of § 385 counts as a 
legislative success for the ALI, § 385 itself was ultimately a failure. In 1983 the 
Treasury abandoned its efforts to promulgate regulations under its § 385 authority. 
Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness, 48 Fed. Reg. 
31054 (July 6, 1983). Section 385 remains in the Code, but the Treasury has never 
resurrected the § 385 regulations project.  
 123 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, 2269-75 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 336). 
 124 ALI SUBCHAPTER C, supra note 114, at 105-19. The ALI’s was not the only 
voice calling for the demise of the doctrine. See George K. Yin, General Utilities Repeal: 
Is Tax Reform Really Going to Pass It By?, 31 TAX NOTES 1111, 1112 n.6 (1986) (citing 
a number of calls for the rejection of the doctrine, including that of the ALI; Yin also 
advocated the doctrine’s demise). 
 125 Daniel Halperin, Saving the Income Tax: An Agenda for Research, 77 TAX 
NOTES 967, 967-68 (1997). 
2014] ALMOST-RESTATEMENT OF INCOME TAX 729 
What is essential is the ALI approach. Reporters to develop detailed 
proposals that can easily be translated into a statutory draft, or even a 
draft itself. Exposure of that draft to a diverse group of consultants who 
will take the time to examine it closely and debate it among themselves. 
Only in that way can we truly appreciate what is possible.126 
Halperin’s proposal was extremely ambitious, but no 
more so than the proposal leading to the 1954 Draft. Yet 
whereas the midcentury ALI eagerly accepted the challenge of 
drafting a nearly-complete income tax statute and brought the 
project to fruition, at the century’s end neither the ALI nor any 
other organization showed any interest in responding to 
Halperin’s call.127 
Part of the explanation for the differing responses in the 
two eras may be that the Code has become too massive for 
anyone to contemplate a comprehensive revision in the spirit of 
the 1954 Draft. This would be especially true if a comprehensive 
twenty-first century income tax project were to follow the 1954 
Draft’s lead in proposing “technical” policy changes while taking 
as a given Congress’s big-picture policy choices. The problem is 
that in 2013, much more than in 1954, Congress’s big-picture 
policy choices mandate very high levels of statutory detail. 
Consider the original issue discount (OID) rules128—first 
enacted in 1969,129 thoroughly revised in 1982,130 and 
thoroughly revised again in 1984131—as one example drawn 
 
 126 Id. at 968. 
 127 The closest thing to a response to Halperin’s call is probably the “Shelf 
Project.” Conceived and directed by Calvin H. Johnson, since 2007 the Project has 
published in Tax Notes dozens of proposals to raise revenue by broadening in principled 
ways the base of the income tax. Calvin H. Johnson, The Shelf Project: Revenue-Raising 
Projects that Defend the Tax Base, 117 TAX NOTES 1077 (2007) (announcing the 
Project); Calvin H. Johnson, Two Years of the Shelf Project, 126 TAX NOTES 513, (2010) 
(describing the early publications of the Project). However, the Project bears only a 
faint resemblance to the ALI’s 1954 Draft, for two reasons. First, the Project picks its 
shots, by offering a number of narrowly targeted reform proposals rather than a 
complete model tax statute. Second, rather than representing a consensus of dozens of 
experts following several rounds of drafts and comments, the Project is largely the 
work of one man. See Calvin H. Johnson, The Evolution of the Shelf Project, 137 TAX 
NOTES 216, (2012) (noting that, as of September 2012, Johnson had authored 46 of the 
67 published Shelf Project proposals). 
 128 Original issue discount is the excess of a debt instrument’s stated 
redemption price at maturity over its issue price. It serves as an economic substitute 
for explicitly-stated interest. Very generally, the OID rules provide for the 
identification of OID and for its taxation as interest income to the holder of the debt 
instrument. 
 129 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 413(a), 83 Stat. 487, 609-11 
(repealed 1984). 
 130 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 
§ 231, 96 Stat. 324, 496-99 (repealed 1984). 
 131 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 41, 98 Stat. 494, 531-43 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1271-75 (2011)). 
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from a large universe of potential examples. A twenty-first 
century income tax project might try to reduce somewhat the 
daunting complexity of the OID rules of the Code and 
regulations, but the project would have to take the existence of 
the OID rules as a given, because the decision to have such 
rules is a big-picture policy decision. There is no way to 
implement that policy decision with anything other than 
complex rules. The authors of the 1954 Draft were not faced 
with this source of complexity, because rules requiring 
bondholders to report OID prior to the receipt of cash did not 
exist at that time. 
The same basic point could be made by reference to the 
anti-tax shelter passive loss rules enacted in 1986,132 or any 
number of other inherently complex post-1954 provisions. Since 
1954 Congress has made numerous big-picture policy choices 
that have, in the aggregate, hugely increased the Code’s 
complexity. A comprehensive twenty-first century project in the 
spirit of the 1954 Draft would have to accept those choices. In 
accepting those choices, the drafters would be taking on a 
challenge many times more formidable than the challenge 
facing the midcentury drafters. 
Perhaps the midcentury ALI had at its disposal the 
services of tax policy giants imbued with a postwar spirit of 
limitless optimism, and perhaps no such giants walk the earth 
today. But even the authors of the 1954 Draft would probably 
throw up their hands at the prospect of doing for today’s 
Internal Revenue Code what they did for the Code of almost six 
decades ago. A bit of fudging was required to call the 1954 
Draft a complete model income tax statute. With its omission of 
procedural provisions and some highly specialized substantive 
provisions,133 the 1954 Draft was not quite a complete model 
statute. Today, however, no remotely plausible amount of 
fudging could make manageable a repeat of the midcentury 
project. The late 1940s and early 1950s presented a unique set 
of circumstances under which the 1954 Draft was possible: a 
Code still simple enough that a not-quite-complete draft of its 
revision could fit on a few hundred printed pages; an elite tax 
bar that had, perhaps, only recently become large enough and 
sophisticated enough to meet the challenge; and a pervasive 
postwar can-do spirit. 
 
 132 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501, 100 Stat. 2085, 2233 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 469). 
 133 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
2014] ALMOST-RESTATEMENT OF INCOME TAX 731 
A complete draft of a model income tax statute might be 
doable even today, if the drafters were willing to jettison the 
1954 Draft’s philosophy of accepting Congress’s big-picture policy 
choices, and if the drafters consistently opted for simpler 
approaches than those of the current Code. But a model statute 
that paid no deference to existing legislative decisions on major 
policy questions would probably be of little or no interest to 
Congress. Thus, a major motivation for the authors of the 1954 
Draft—the prospect that much of their work would find its way 
into the Internal Revenue Code—would be missing under this 
approach. 
In sum, the drafting of a model statute accepting the 
major policy choices embodied in the current Internal Revenue 
Code is too daunting a task for the ALI (or anyone else), and 
the alternative of drafting a model statute without deference to 
existing legislative policy choices may be a quixotic endeavor if 
the goal is to influence legislation. As a result, we may never 
again see an income tax project—from the ALI or any other 
source—comparable to the 1954 Draft. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the virtual impossibility today of a repeat of the 
ALI’s 1954 performance, two promising avenues remain for 
ALI tax projects. The first is simply the continuation of the 
ALI’s post-1954 approach of focusing on narrow aspects of the 
income tax—typically on one or another subchapter of the Code. 
In particular, one area comes to mind where an ALI project could 
perform a very valuable service. Congress recently codified the 
anti-tax-shelter economic substance doctrine,134 but in such a way 
that most of the pre-codification judicial development of the 
doctrine retains its vitality. As it happens, however, the case law 
in this crucial area is a complete muddle.135 An ALI Restatement 
of the economic substance doctrine—and it would be a 
Restatement, because the point of the project would be to bring 
order and clarity to existing law, rather than to change the 
law—could be tremendously useful to the courts, to taxpayers, 
and to the Internal Revenue Service. 
 
 134 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, § 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067-70 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (2011)). 
 135 On the existence of the muddle, see, e.g., David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the 
Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 236 (1999). The doctrine has not 
become much less tangled in the years since Hariton’s article appeared. 
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The second possibility is to reject the requirement that 
any project must have a high probability of being reflected in 
legislation in the near term. Having thrown off that constraint, 
the ALI’s tax experts would be free to dream. Unfettered by a rule 
that only “technical” policy choices are up for grabs, the ALI’s 
drafters might pursue Halperin’s quest for a deep rethinking of 
the ways an income tax code measures income, or some other goal 
of equal audacity. The legislative prospects of such a project 
would surely be poorer than those of a project in the spirit of the 
1954 Draft, but if enough legislators come to view the current 
income tax as fundamentally broken the odds against the 
legislative success of the project might not be impossibly long. 
